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CHILDREN'S INTERESTS IN A FAMILY
CONTEXT-A CAUTIONARY NOTE
James G. Dwyer*
I. INTRODUCTION
The symposium organizers have posed the question
whether children's needs are better advanced in abuse and
neglect cases by greater emphasis on children's interests
standing on their own or children's interests seen in the
context of the families in which they live. I have some
difficulty grasping the meaning of the question-particularly
what it means for children to have interests "standing on
their own"-but I will respond to the question based on two
possible interpretations. On one interpretation, it is a
question about the scope of children's interests that judges
should take into account in reaching a disposition in abuse or
neglect cases. Specifically, it is a question of whether judges
should consider a child's relationship interests; that is, what
the effects on a child would be from altering or ending a
relationship with parents, siblings, extended family members,
or other persons in. the child's life. On a second
interpretation, it is a question about how judges should define
the content of children's interests and specifically whether
they should assume those children have the same interests
regardless of their family situation. Instead, should judges
recognize that each child's interests-even those interests
that do not maintain certain relationships-are, at least in
part, specific to and defined by the particular family of which
the child is a member.
Under either interpretation, the second alternative in the
question posed must be the correct one. That is, children's
* Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law. Thanks to
all of my colleagues at the University of Wyoming for their thoughtful responses
to a presentation of an early draft of this paper.
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needs are best served by focusing on their interests within the
context of their families. With respect to the scope of
children's interests, it is indisputable that children have very
important relationship interests and that those interests can
be adversely affected by certain kinds of attempts to stop
abusive behavior. It would therefore be foolish, in trying to
promote a child's welfare, not to consider those interests.
Ideally, courts should, whenever possible, end abuse by
improving, not ending, parent-child relationships, while also
preserving the child's relationships with other persons who
are important in their lives. In addition, children have an
interest simply in being part of a family, independent of the
particular individual relationships this entails,' because being
a member of a family creates a sense of belonging and human
connectedness, best prepares a person to enter into
relationships as an adult, and is "normal"-a characteristic of
no little importance to children. Judges should also consider
this important aspect of a child's relationship interests in
rendering a disposition. Foster care is unlikely to satisfy
these interests, and even when children are adopted, it may
take considerable time before they come to see a new,
adoptive family as "their" family.
With respect to how children's interests should be
defined, it is indisputable that families are not generic, and
there is no good reason to try to make them generic. Judges
should take as a given that different sets of parents have
different cultural practices, values, and personalities, and
recognize that these differences may partly determine what
the state should deem best for any particular child. Thus, for
example, in a case in which the goal is to "rehabilitate"
parents charged with abuse or neglect, the judge or child
protective agency structuring the rehabilitation ideally
should consider such things as the capacities of the parents
involved, which strategies those parents are likely to perceive
as most threatening to their role as parent or to their chosen
way of life, and whether certain mandated changes in a
child's life might, given the child's existing perception of the
world through the lens of family and community life, be an
unhealthy confusion or psychological conflict for the child.
The child's situation calls for tailor-made solutions, not a one-
1. I am indebted to Brad Saxton for this point.
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size-fits-all approach to intervention.
Having concluded that under either of two
interpretations of the question posed the answer is
straightforward and unlikely to generate disagreement, I
offer a few cautionary observations about viewing children's
interests in the context of their family relationships. These
observations can be grouped into two sets. The first set
reflects beliefs that jurisprudence relating to parent-child
relationships is, for the most part, not child-centered; that
entrenched attitudes about child-rearing present a great
obstacle to moving the legal system toward a child-centered
jurisprudence and away from the current, adult-centered
jurisprudence; and that in light of those attitudes, loose talk
about "children in the family" can easily lead to slippage from
a focus on the interests of children to a focus on the interests
of adults. The second set of observations arises from a
perception that the assertions of judges and commentators
about children's relationship interests are often overly
simplistic, ignoring important differences across situations
and over the course of a child's life. I will suggest certain
distinctions that should be made in that context, but are
frequently not made.
II. THE RHETORIC OF CHILD PROTECTION
The first set of observations relates to a concern that a
certain danger inheres in practice with recommending to
judges that they look at children's interests in the context of
their family situation, or recommending that judges look at a
family as a whole, with the aim of improving the functioning
of "the family." The danger is that such an exhortation will
exacerbate an existing tendency of judges in abuse and
neglect proceedings, indeed, in any proceedings regarding
parent-child relationships, to focus on the adults involved
rather than the children. From my experience representing
children and parents in family court proceedings, and from
reading innumerable judicial opinions concerning the law
governing child-rearing, I have formed the impression that in
all kinds of cases posing a conflict between parents and the
state, judges' primary concern is with the rights and
preferences of parents rather than with the interests of
10551999]
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children.2 The rights and preferences of parents may coincide
to some degree with the interests of children, but rarely do so
perfectly and often do so very little.
What seems to happen in abuse and neglect cases,
specifically, is that judges decide cases in large part on the
basis of some, often unconscious, judgment about the overall
moral worth, attractiveness, or deservingness of the parents
2. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1978) (upholding state statute
allowing parents to commit children to psychiatric hospital without adversary
hearing, emphasizing the historical tradition of "parental autonomy" and
discounting the possibility of a conflict of interests between parent and child);
New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of E. Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp.
293, 318-19 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that requiring state approval of all private
schools, and basing approval in part on qualifications of teachers, violated
parents religious free exercise rights, because giving the state power to ensure
that all children become intellectually autonomous would conflict with the
fundamental interest of parents "to guide the religious future and education of
their children."'); Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986) (reversing order
of custody to father based in part on fact that father had remarried and the
step-mother would be at home to provide constant care, because such a basis
"suggests an insensitivity to the role of working parents" and would be "unfair"
to the mother, who had previously been the primary caretaker); In re D.L.E.,
614 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. 1980) (holding that parent was entitled as a matter of
free exercise of religion to refuse to provide treatment for child's seizures absent
imminent danger to the child's life); State v. Kaimimoku, 841 P.2d 1076 (Haw.
1992) (reversing child abuse conviction of man who repeatedly slapped and
punched his daughter, based on a conclusion that the father's purpose was to
punish misconduct (the daughter's swearing at the father for verbally abusing
his wife) and not to inflict serious physical injury, and giving no consideration to
the well-being or rights of the daughter); In re John Doe and Jane Doe, 638
N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) (holding that best interests of
three year old adopted child are irrelevant to determination of his custody
following nullification of adoption, in an opinion dominated by discussion of
which set of adults-the adoptive parents or the biological parents-was more
at fault for the biological father's non-involvement in the initial adoption
proceeding); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979) (upholding post-
divorce transfer of custody to father solely because mother's cohabiting with a
boyfriend was immoral); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 222-23 (Mass.
1971) (analyzing religious exemption to child immunization law entirely in
terms of rights of parents who wanted their children not to be immunized but
were not covered by the exemption, and urging these parents to petition the
state legislature for a broader exemption); Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152
(Iowa), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966) (awarding custody of child to maternal
grandparents rather than father following death of mother "based upon his
Bohemian approach to finances and life in general"); Ostermiller v. Spurr, 1998
WL 850267 (Wyo. Dec. 18, 1998) (upholding trial court order that four-year old
child have normal visitation with, and adopt last name of, a father the child had
never seen, based on evidence that the father now "wants to enjoy a relationship
with the child, has a suitable residence, stable home and regular employment
for that purpose").
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involved,' rather than simply a judgment about the parents'
capacity to fulfill specific needs of their children. They begin
with a strong presumption of parental deservingness based
on the constitutionally protected rights that parents are
understood to hold.4 A judge's ultimate conclusion about the
3. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982). ("Permanent neglect
proceedings employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations
unusually open to the subjective values of the judge.... Because parents
subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of
minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on
cultural or class bias."). In custody cases, the backward-looking "primary
caretaker" consideration, even though it may be a somewhat reliable predictor
of which custodial arrangement is best for a child, but see David Chambers,
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 477 (1984) (discussing empirical evidence as to connection between which
parent was the primary caretaker in the past and which custodial arrangement
would be best for a child in the future), in practice is frequently treated, and in
scholarship is often discussed, as a reward for the parent who has sacrificed the
most for the child in the past. See, e.g., Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal.
1986) (stating that an assumption that a working mother cannot provide
adequate care for a child, relative to a father's non-working new spouse, would
be "unfair when, as here, the mother has in fact been the primary caretaker");
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that the parent who
was the primary caretaker in the past is to receive custody absent a showing
that she is unfit, based in part on the perception that the primary caretaker will
feel more intensely "the terrible prospect of losing the child"); Martha Fineman,
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988) (arguing that a primary
caretaker presumption should apply in all custody disputes between parents).
See also Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair?, 35 U. LOUISVILLE
J. FAM. L. 325 (1997) (arguing that rules in several areas of the law governing
children's lives compromise children's interests to some degree in order to
achieve what is perceived as fairness to parents).
4. See, e.g., In re Jeffrey S., 1998 WL 879652, *13 (Ohio App.) ("[A] parent's
right to due process as a result of his or her fundamental right to raise his or
her children must be protected."); In re Henderson, 1997 WL 752633, *5 (Ohio
App.) ("As a parent, appellant has a right to due process as a result of his
fundamental right to raise his child."); In re Shane "00", 664 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114
(N.Y. 1996) ("Due process requires that [a parent] at least be afforded an
opportunity to put [the state child protective agency] to its proof, and to
challenge its purported justification for refusing to relinquish custody before
being deprived of his fundamental right to raise his son."); J.P. v. Marion
County Office of Family and Children, 653 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. 1995) ("[T]he
courts of this state have long and consistently held that the right to raise one's
children is essential, basic, more precious than property rights, and within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.");
In re Howard, 382 So.2d 194, 198 (La. 1980) ("The right or interest at issue in
an abuse/neglect proceeding is the right of a parent to custody and control of his
or her child."); Brown v. Guy, 476 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. Nev. 1979) ("A parent's
right to the companionship, care, custody and control of their children is
fundamental.").
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parents' deservingness in a particular case, however, may not
lead to the same outcomes as would a focus on the interests of
the children whose needs are going unsatisfied, and a
narrower examination of the parents in terms of their ability
to satisfy the children's interests.
The tendency to decide by focusing on parents, rather
than on the interests of children, can skew results in either
direction. If a judge is repulsed by a particular parent for
reasons unrelated to the parent's ability to provide for the
welfare of the child, dispositions may be punitive rather than
designed primarily to do what is best for the child.5 A judge
may be repulsed not only by what the state has accused the
parent of doing, but also by the parents' appearance
(including race), demeanor, social class, and general way of
life (e.g., whether they are employed or on welfare, whether
they use drugs, whether they are sexually promiscuous).
Others have remarked on this phenomenon in the specific
contexts of racial and class prejudice; they have asserted that
some judges consciously or unconsciously perceive parents
who are poor or who are members of certain racial minorities
as inherently less able parents, or simply less deserving
human beings.6 My perception is that the phenomenon is
broader, and that there is some tendency of judges to make
judgments about the overall moral worth or attractiveness of
parents based on other characteristics or observed behaviors
that may not be inherently related to the interests of
children.
Peggy Cooper-Davis has demonstrated that certain
psychological factors may skew results in favor of overly
aggressive intervention in abuse and neglect cases-for
example, a judge's fear of being responsible for harm to a
child left unprotected, out of both a genuine moral concern for
the welfare of children and a concern for public criticism of a
5. Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981)
("forced dissolution of the parent-child relationship has been recognized as a
punitive sanction by courts, Congress, and commentators.").
6. See, e.g., Douglas E. Cressler, Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt in Parental Rights Termination Cases, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 785,
809-811 (1994) (regarding race, social class, and other bias factors); Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHIC. L. REV. 209, 267-68 (1995) (regarding
racial prejudice); Note, The Other 'Neglected' Parties in Child Protective
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of Lawyers Who Represent Them,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (1998).
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failure to intervene! However, there are also very strong
pulls in the direction of non-intervention. While judges are
likely to come from a different social class than the parents
they are judging, judges will have some tendency to identify
with the parents simply because the judges are also adults
and often parents. I suspect no judge would deny that he or
she is influenced by sympathy for any parents who are in
danger of losing their children. In addition, the impact of
doctrine and public discourse about parental rights should
not be underestimated, as they create a tremendous legal and
attitudinal obstacle to termination of a parent-child
relationship and indeed to any interference with parental
freedom.8 The impact is likely to vary from judge to judge,
depending on his or her political and moral outlook. But it is
fair to say that the belief that parents have a presumptive
entitlement to be left alone, which is forfeited only when their
conduct is truly egregious or their judgment in child-rearing
is way outside the bounds of reasonableness (itself a very
permissive (and amorphous) standard), generally has a strong
hold on the judiciary, just as it does on the public.9 Whether
or not one endorses this belief in parental entitlement,' 9 one
must concede that the belief encourages a focus on parents
and on whether the parents have forfeited their entitlement,
in proceedings that are supposed to be child protective
proceedings.
The fact that only parents, not children, have
constitutionally protected rights in child protective
proceedings encourages a focus on the parents for an
7. See Peggy Cooper-Davis and Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for
Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 139 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Hendry v. Marion County Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 616 N.E.2d
388, 391 (Ind. 1993) ("[A] parent has a fundamental right to raise her child
without undue interference by the state, and the parent-child relationship
includes a parent's right to have unrestrained custody of her child."').
9. See, e.g., Reed v. Dillard, 652 A.2d 18, 26 (Del. 1995) ("[The child's]
interests [in termination proceedings] are circumscribed by the competing
constitutional rights of her biological parents. While the State may intervene in
that relationship, it may do so only on clear and convincing evidence that the
parent has forfeited the parental entitlement.").
10. For arguments that such a belief is misguided, see JAMES G. DWYER,
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998) [hereinafter DWYER,
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS] and James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's
Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Children's Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371
(1994).
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additional reason, and that is simply that the natural
starting point for a legally-trained mind is with the rights of
parties to a dispute. The now rejected coverture law regime,
which conferred rights principally on the husband in a
marital relationship, had the same effect with respect to
spousal abuse." What a judge would ask, if such a problem
ever found its way to the courthouse, was not what was best
for the wife or what her preferences were or what resources
she had for self-help, but rather whether the husband was so
reprehensible that he should be deemed to have forfeited his
right to the unfettered rule of the home.
The legal standards for termination of parental rights,
predicated on parental entitlement, also invite a focus on the
parents. While states are beginning to add a "best interests
of the child" requirement to termination provisions,
historically the only standard has been whether parents'
behavior was sufficiently egregious or whether a parent was
minimally "fit."" And even in states where today a best
interests finding is required, that determination is made only
after the court makes a judgment about how reprehensible
the parents are; it is an additional requirement for
termination, not a substitute basis sufficient in itself to
terminate. 3 In some states, child protective workers may not
11. See Honorable Pamela M. Macktaz, Domestic Violence: A View from the
Bench, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISsUES 37, 37-38 (discussing judicial
treatment of domestic violence under the common law coverture regime and
quoting State v. Black, 60 N.C. 162, 163 (Win. 1864):
[Tihe law permits [a man] to use towards his wife such a degree of force
as is necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave
herself; and unless some permanent injury be inflicted, and there be an
excessive use of violence, or such a degree of cruelty as shows that it is
inflicted to gratify his own bad passions, the law will not invade the
domestic forum, or go behind the curtain.
Id.
12. See, e.g., J.K.C. v. Fountain County Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 470 N.E.2d
88, 93 (Ind. 1984) ("Children are not removed from the custody of their parents
because there is a better place for them, but because the situation while in the
custody of their parents is wholly inadequate for their survival."); In re J.P., 648
P.2d 1364, 1366 (Utah 1982); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121, 1128 (Kan.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 919, 102 S. Ct. 1274, 71 L.Ed.2d 459 (1982) ("[Tlhe
right of... a parent to custody of the child cannot be taken away in favor of a
third person, absent a finding of unfitness on the part of the parent.").
13. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-112 (West 1998); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 39.802, 39.806 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b;
VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STAT. § 211.447 (West 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292; S.
CAR. STAT. § 20-7-768 (West 1999); S. DAK. COD. LAws § 26-8A-26 (West 1999);
1060 [Vol. 39
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even order services for parents and their child absent a
showing of severe harm to the child."
In practice, the focus on adults fostered by attributing
rights only to them and by basing termination decisions
primarily or solely on an assessment of the parents, is made
easier by the fact that abused and neglected children are
typically out of sight during court proceedings.'5 The children
ordinarily do not attend the court proceedings or appear
before the judge in any other setting. In addition, the
children's attorneys typically play a far less active role than
do attorneys of the parents and the state. The fact that the
children are out of sight must make it more difficult for
judges to keep them in mind. In contrast, the judge comes
face to face with the parent in the courtroom, and it is the
parent and his or her attorneys with whom the judge must
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (West 1999); VA. STAT. § 16.1-283 (West 1999).
See also In re G.D. Jr. & C.D., 894 P.2d 1278, 1284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("[Ilt is
unconstitutional to terminate a parent's rights based upon a finding of the best
interest of the child without first finding that the parent is below some
minimum threshold of fitness."); In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 582 (R.I. 1987)
("Absent a finding of unfitness, the natural parents' right to bear and raise their
child in a less than perfect way remains superior to the rights of foster parents
who may be exemplary nurturers."); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760
(1982).
[Tihe private interest affected-weighs heavily against use of the
preponderance standard at a state-initiated permanent neglect
proceeding. We do not deny that the child and his foster parents are
also deeply interested in the outcome of that contest. But at the
factfinding stage of the New York proceeding, the focus emphatically is
not on them. The factfinding does not purport-and is not intended-
to balance the child's interest in a normal family home against the
parents' interest in raising the child. Nor does it purport to determine
whether the natural parents or the foster parents would provide the
better home. Rather, the factfmding hearing pits the State directly
against the parents. The State alleges that the natural parents are at
fault.... Victory by the State... entails a judicial determination that
the parents are unfit to raise their own children.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
14. See, e.g., McHencry v. Bartholomew County Dept. of Public Welfare, 581
N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ind. 1991) (disapproving of child protective intervention to
stop excessive punishment of teenage girl, and stating that "[Intervention is
not justified unless the punishment seriously impairs or endangers the child's
emotional or physical well-being.").
15. See Jessica Liebergott Hamblen and Murray Levine, The Legal
Implications and Emotional Consequences of Sexually Abused Children
Testifying as Victim-Witnesses, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 159-166, 172
(1997) (noting that few children testify in criminal child abuse proceedings and
describing numerous studies that revealed only a small minority of abused
children testify in court).
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principally come to terms in rendering a decision. Children
left unprotected do not complain, and they do not vote. And
the public rarely becomes aware of children who continue to
be abused because the courts failed to take appropriate steps
to protect them. In contrast, every disgruntled parent is a
disgruntled voter, as are the parent's relatives and friends,
and public outcry against an inappropriate intervention is
probably at least as loud and frequent as public outcry
against inappropriate non-intervention.
16
If this impression of how judges make decisions in abuse
and neglect cases is accurate, then it would be a step in the
right direction if judges began their evaluation by considering
what is best for the child, rather than by looking first and
foremost at the parents and the parents' interests and rights.
Of course, in examining the interests of a child, the court
ultimately must consider whether the child's current parent
or parents can satisfy those interests, and that requires
making some judgment about the parents. I am simply
recommending that this judgment be limited to the parents'
ability to satisfy certain interests of the children, rather than
constituting an overall evaluation of the parents' moral
worth, deservingness, or attractiveness as human beings, or
an assessment of whether the parents have forfeited their
entitlement to undisturbed governance of their children. In
addition, sympathy for parents has no place in child
protective proceedings, any more than sympathy for abusive
husbands has a place in proceedings to protect abused wives.
A truly child-centered jurisprudence would mean that the
focus of legal and moral attention is entirely on the well-being
of the abused or neglected child.
Because I believe judges all too frequently focus on the
adults involved rather than on the children, and base their
dispositions, at least partly, on how much sympathy they
have for the parents, I am wary of any recommendation that
judges focus on "the family," even if the idea is supposed to be
that they focus on the family only in relation to the child's
interests. I am wary because of the meaning and effect of
modern rhetoric regarding the family. 7 It is common for
16. The public that would cry out is, after all, the adult public, and adults
are at least as likely to identify and sympathize with other adults, as they are to
identify or sympathize with children.
17. See Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers,
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those who urge lesser state intervention into parent-child
relationships to couch their arguments in terms of "protecting
the family" or respecting "family autonomy" or "family
rights."' 8 This terminology is highly problematic.
Typically when people speak or write about protecting
families or respecting "family autonomy" or "family rights,"
one or both of two things is going on. First, in the speaker's
mind, though perhaps only subconsciously, the rhetoric is a
thinly disguised call for stronger protection and freedom for
parents, as against state efforts to protect children, motivated
by sympathy for parents whose freedom in child-rearing the
state has constrained. 9 Second, in listeners' minds, when
they hear the term "family autonomy" or "family rights," they
understandably think "parental freedom" and "parents'
rights," just as when one hears the term "national
sovereignty" applied to a country ruled by a despot, even a
benevolent despot, one thinks of the despot's freedom to do
what he wants rather than an exercise of collective will by the
people of that country. For example, when one hears
someone speak of "Iraq's national sovereignty," one thinks of
Saddam Hussein doing whatever he wants. Similarly, when
one hears "family autonomy," one thinks of parents doing
what they want. This analogy is not intended to suggest that
the average parent rules the family the way Hussein rules
Iraq-though certainly some parents do. Rather, it is to
identify a conceptual problem that arises when autonomy or
rights are attributed to groups that do not operate on the
basis of democratic decision-making among free and equal
persons, and a psychological phenomenon that occurs when
groups of that nature are discussed, namely, that reference to
the group gets mentally translated into a reference to the
Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101
(1998) ("The language that we use in the discussion of a social issue is not
without significance. Language not only has the effect of conveying ideas, but
the manner in which an issue is discussed can have an impact both on the
relationship between the parties involved in the discussion and the incentive
these parties have to reconceptualize the issue or approach it in new ways.").
18. See, e.g., Joan C. Bohl, Family Autonomy vs. Grandparent Visitation:
How Precedent Fell Prey to Sentiment in Herndon v. Tuhey, 62 Mo. L. REV. 755
(1997); Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 431,
440 (1996); Note, Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten Victims in
the Battle Against Child Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135, 161 (1997).
19. These terms have also been used in an analogous fashion to advocate for
greater protection of husbands against efforts to protect or empower wives.
1999] 1063
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rulers of the group.
To put it differently, notions of "family autonomy" and
"family rights" are conceptually incoherent, and that
incoherence generates confusion. Whatever sense the notions
of group autonomy or group rights might make in other
contexts, they make no sense in the context of the family,
which is inherently non-democratic, at least while children
are very young. Use of such terminology serves only to mask
claims for greater individual rights for adults. Scholars of
family law should, therefore, take a pledge to never use these
terms. And while we are at it, we should also commit to
never using the term "parental autonomy," which is not only
conceptually incoherent, but in fact an oxymoron.
"Autonomy" means self-rule, self-determination, and
parenting is not self-determination; it is an "other-
determining" activity. Joining the terms "autonomy" and
"parental" is therefore nonsensical. People use that term, just
as they use "family autonomy" and "family rights," because it
has greater moral purchase than does an assertion of
"parental right" or "parental freedom," even though they all
amount to precisely the same thing." So let us call things
what they are. It is ironic that people so commonly get away
with using such terms in discussing child-rearing when, if
someone today were to assert "marital autonomy," "marital
rights," or "husband autonomy" in opposition to intervention
to protect battered wives, he would be torn to intellectual
shreds. We need to take the same critical stance in relation
to the discourse surrounding child-rearing. We need to
develop a self-conscious "critical children's theory" approach
to family law.2'
20. See, e.g., Diane L. Abraham, California's Stepparent Visitation Statute:
For the Welfare of the Child, Or a Court-Opened Door to Legally Interfere with
Parental Autonomy: Where are the Constitutional Safeguards?, 7 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 125 (1997); Stephen Gilles, On Educating Children: A
Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 1004 (1996) ("[P]arents' decisions
about which values to instill in their child involve 'choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy."') (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992)).
21. There are probably more apt terms than "critical children's theory," but
I cannot think of any that are also as suggestive of a comparison with other
critical theories. I would include many works by contemporary scholars under
the heading of critical children's theory-works that reveal illicit attitudes
about children underlying legal doctrine pertaining to parent-child
relationships, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer
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The upshot of this discussion of terminology is that I fear
that encouraging judges to focus on "the family" can,
depending on how it is expressed, exacerbate an existing
tendency to focus on parents rather than children in abuse
and neglect cases, and that encouraging judges to protect
families may lead them simply to give even greater protection
to parents. Stronger protection for parents would produce
better results for children in some cases-namely, those
where termination or other highly interventionist disposition
is in fact not the best thing for the child, but where judges are
nevertheless inclined to terminate parental rights because
they have formed an adverse overall moral judgment of the
parents, and this judgment is sufficient to override the
presumption of deservingness and entitlement. But it would
be achieving that result in the wrong way in those cases-
that is, by still focusing on the parents. And more
importantly, in the majority of cases where courts are already
over-protective of parents, a decision not to terminate
parental rights out of sympathy for them, and respect for
their legal and presumed moral rights, would lead to worse
results for children.
Under the second alternative interpretation of the
question posed, I concluded above that judges ideally should
define the content of a particular child's interests by reference
to the specific characteristics of the child's family and
community." But this conclusion, too, suggests a danger
inherent in making a particular recommendation to judges,
given the adult-centered nature of family law jurisprudence.
The danger in this context is that judges will substitute the
parents' judgment of the child's interests for their own
judgment-guided by statutory criteria, empirical research,
and case-specific evidence-of the child's interests. This
and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992); works
that challenge assumptions about the relationship between the state and
families and the notion that the parent-child relationship is a "private"
phenomenon, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,
18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 835 (1985); and works that urge recognition of new
constitutional rights for children by challenging generally assumed
justifications for treating children differently from adults, e.g., Susan A.
Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime
Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353
(1998).
22. This may be a very difficult thing to do in practice.
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approach obviously would make the entire child protective
proceeding pointless. To adopt the parents' judgment is to
abdicate the state's role of protecting children's interests, and
to abandon a child-centered jurisprudence. It is one thing for
the state to say that, within certain limits defined by the state
based on the state's perception of what is best for children,
parents should be free to act on the basis of their judgments
as to their child's interests, because this parental freedom is,
in the state's view, a good thing for children. It is quite
different to say that parents are entitled to have their
judgment of their child's interests control the outcome of an
abuse or neglect proceeding, or any other legal dispute over
their child's welfare. The latter position is unacceptable from
a perspective that takes seriously the morally and legally
distinct personhood of a child. 3
The danger, then, is that judges will understand a
recommendation to take into account a particular parent's
characteristics, including culture, in making a situation-
specific determination of a child's interests, as a
recommendation to effectuate the parent's judgment, by
adopting the parent's beliefs as the court's basis for deciding
the outcome. The danger would be greatest where parental
judgments appear to arise out of minority cultural practices
and beliefs, because misunderstandings of liberal notions of
toleration and self-determination lead many people to believe
that the freedom the state must accord to adults in directing
their own lives must also be given to parents in directing the
lives of children. That the United States Supreme Court
enshrined this fundamental misunderstanding into a
constitutional principle in Wisconsin v. Yoder 4 makes it all
the more likely that judges will misconstrue a
recommendation to define children's interests by reference to
the particular families in which they live.
What is needed, if the goal is to get courts to consistently
make decisions in abuse and neglect cases that are in the
child's best interests, is a way to refocus judges' attention on
children, while still encouraging them to take into account
that a child's interests are affected by their particular family
23. See DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS, supra note 10.
24. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the free exercise rights of Amish
parents entitle them to keep their children out of school beyond the eighth
grade).
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situation and typically include interests in maintaining
family relationships. In terms of rhetoric, the language we
use in exhorting decision-makers to make decisions in certain
ways, perhaps the way to do that is to not talk about
"focusing on the family" or "protecting families," but rather to
talk simply about "children's relationship interests," to spell
out concretely and specifically what those interests are,25 and
to make judges conscious of the danger of slippage, of shifting
their focus from children's interests to parents' worth or
attractiveness or deservingness.
In terms of legal changes, perhaps a "best interests of the
child" requirement should be the only requirement for
termination of the parent-child relationship,26 just as it is, at
least nominally, the only criterion for deciding the contours of
children's relationships with divorcing parents. In the
abstract, this might cause some alarm because it conjures up
images of judges terminating parent-child relationships and
shuffling children around based on the judges' subjective
judgments about optimal parenting. But a "best interests"
standard could be fleshed out in termination statutes, just as
it is in custody provisions, to constrain judges' decisions in
whatever ways are appropriate.
For example, a termination provision could spell out that
judges must make an explicit finding regarding the strength
of a child's interest in maintaining a relationship with the
abusive or neglectful parent and in remaining part of his or
her current family and community. Additionally, the
provision could direct that judges order termination of the
parent-child relationship only if they find, based on strong
evidence, that the anticipated future harm to the child from
remaining in a relationship with the parent, after less severe
measures of preventing the abuse or neglect are considered
and perhaps attempted, outweighs the child's interest in
maintaining the relationship. Thus, a properly constrained
25. See infra at Part III.A.
26. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Utah 1982) (holding
unconstitutional a statute providing for termination of parental rights based
solely on the best interests of the child, rejecting the State's argument that "'any
distinction (between the best interest and unfitness standards) is a mere matter
of semantics,'" and determining instead that replacing an unfitness standard
with a best interest standard "deleted a statutory protection for the parental
rights of fit parents" and did "not provide equivalent protection for parental
rights.").
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"best interests of the child" analysis could subsume some of
the requirements now embedded in a "scope of parental
rights" analysis. But changing the analysis from an
assessment of whether parents have forfeited their right to a
relationship, to an assessment of what is best for the child,
should help to refocus judges' attention on the abused or
neglected child.
III. A MORE REFINED UNDERSTANDING OF RELATIONSHIP
INTERESTS
In this section, I want to unpack the idea of children's
relationship interests a little, and also make a point about
parents' relationship interests. I offer the observation about
parents' interests not because I think judges should consider
them in child protective proceedings, but because I think
judges do consider them and I believe a better understanding
of what is best for an abusive parent might lessen any
tendency not to intervene in situations of abuse and neglect
because of sympathy for parents or solicitude for parental
rights.
A. The Nature and Relative Weight of Children's
Relationship Interests
The observation is now a familiar one that children have
an interest, along with other, possibly contrary interests, in
maintaining their relationships with their parents and other
family members, including extended family and anyone with
whom there is an intimate connection, even when there has
been abuse by parents. 7 Let us dissect this observation a bit.
What interests, exactly, does a child have in maintaining a
relationship with an abusive parent?
Even in the worst cases, a child has an interest in having
a relationship with his biological parents. Whether socially
constructed or innate, most people appear to have a desire for
that connection. This is manifest in the great lengths to
which many adopted children go to find their biological
parents. It is important to recognize, though, that in many
cases this is the only interest a child has in a relationship
27. The observation is often traced to the 1970s writings of Joseph
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit: Before the Best Interests of the
Child (1979) and Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973).
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with a parent. Such cases comprise at least two kinds. One
situation where it might be true that a child's only interest in
having a parent-child relationship is an interest in the
biological connection is where there is no existing
relationship. This may be the case where the child is a
newborn or where the abusing parent has been absent from
the family until just before the abuse occurred. The other
situation is where there is an existing relationship with no
positive aspects, that is, where the child receives no benefit
from interaction with the parent. In both situations, where
the only interest of the child that may count in favor of a
relationship with a parent is the biological connection, there
ought to be some basis for evaluating the importance of that
interest, in order to determine whether it outweighs
countervailing interests of the child. I do not know whether
sufficient empirical work has been or could be done to inform
that evaluation, but my perception is that courts do not look
for such work. Instead, each judge operates on the basis of
some amorphous and unarticulated personal intuition about
the importance of the biological connection, and the parties
are left guessing how much weight it received relative to
other interests of the child.
This question about the importance of biology arose for
me in practice not only in abuse cases, but also in some
custody/visitation disputes, particularly those between never-
married parents. In some cases where a parent had not
abused the child but also had not yet formed a relationship, it
was my judgment as guardian ad litem that the parent had so
many problems that he was unlikely to provide anything good
for the child in the foreseeable future and was, in fact, likely
to do harm. Moreover, I could see that the process of trying to
create a relationship in such situations had the potential to
harm the child. For example, imposing on a custodial parent
an eighteen year routine of delivering the child for visitation
with a non-custodial parent whom the custodial parent does
not trust could have a substantial negative effect on the
child's life. When the custodial parent is upset, the child
experiences stress and the custodial parent is a less effective
care-giver. In some of these situations, I was forced to
conclude that-biological connection aside-the child would
be better off if he or she never developed a relationship with
the non-custodial parent.
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In other, more blunt terms, put in the position of having
to recommend one way or the other about visitation with a
non-custodial biological parent, I was sometimes forced to
conclude that that the non-custodian was simply not qualified
to be a parent. I then had to ask myself whether the child's
interest just in having the connection with a biological parent
trumped the conclusion that the biological parent was
incapable of acting as a caretaking parent. I usually assumed
that it did not, but I had no basis for that assumption other
than my own intuitions.
If someone were to object that it is more than a little
frightening that a lawyer, someone trained in law, not the
social sciences, would make such a judgment based on just a
few interviews with the parties, I would not disagree. Given
the reality of representing children in these cases, however, I
do not see any responsible alternative. To not make anyjudgment is simply to leave things in the hands of lawyers,
none of whom is required to advocate exclusively for what is
best for the child. What many attorneys representing
children do in these situations is take a conservative
approach and recommend modest visitation, perhaps in a
supervised setting, for an indefinite period of time. They
make this recommendation, in my view, not because they
attach greater importance to the biological connection than I
do, but because they either 1) do not wish judges or other
attorneys to perceive them as radical, and in light of
established law and practice a recommendation of "no
relationship" is viewed as radical, even if it is the best
outcome for the child, or 2) fail to take seriously their role as
an independent advocate for the child and instead believe
that they must defer to what they understand as the rights of
the parent. Neither of these is an appropriate basis for a
recommendation by a guardian ad litem or attorney
representing a child.
In other situations, there will be both the benefit of the
biological connection and a psychological or emotional benefit
for the child from maintaining a relationship with an abusive
parent. In many, perhaps most, situations, there is both a
positive and a negative aspect to the parent-child
relationship. In these situations, if measures other than
termination of parental rights can succeed in ending abusive
behavior and in assisting the parent to become a better
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parent within a reasonable period of time, then clearly that
should be done. It is less clear what should be done in the not
uncommon situation where the parent cannot be
rehabilitated, yet the child still has an interest in
maintaining the relationship. In such cases, a balancing of
interests would seem to be called for, one that takes into
account the strength of the relationship and the severity of
the abuse or neglect that is expected to continue. This
weighing of interests should be based on the best possible
evidence about the nature of the particular relationship at
issue and the harm that ending it would cause the child,
given the age, psychological and emotional state, and other
characteristics of the particular child involved, rather than on
generalized assumptions about the importance of continuity
in children's lives. It is not inconceivable that that balancing
might sometimes dictate that some harm to the child must be
reluctantly accepted, or in other words, that some abuse must
be tolerated (though certainly not condoned), as disquieting
as that sounds. In addition, this interest of the child in
maintaining a relationship despite abuse by a parent who
cannot be rehabilitated may create a preference for certain
kinds of placement if termination is necessary-for example,
the increasingly common practice of foster care or adoption by
relatives.
B. The Flip-Side of the "Unity of Interests"Anthem
Having said that courts should not focus on the adults
involved in abuse and neglect cases, I want nevertheless to
make a point about parents' interests that I think is generally
overlooked. It is the obverse of the observation that parent
and child share an interest in avoiding unwarranted
intervention. Just as it once may have been common for
judges and child welfare workers to think that all of an
abused child's interests point in favor of intervention, and to
overlook the fact that intervention can entail costs for the
child, I believe it still common for judges and others to make
the mistake of thinking that all of a parent's interests point in
favor of non-intervention. The mistake derives from thinking
that parents' typical expression of what they want-to be left
alone, is actually what is best for them.
I am going to go out on a limb and suggest that parents
do not benefit from being able to abuse their children. To the
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contrary, all human beings benefit from having healthy
relationships with others, and particularly from having
healthy, loving relationships with family members. I doubt
that anyone conceives of abusing one's children as an aspect
of human flourishing. In addition, a parent who alienates his
children by maltreating them is a parent who, after the
children are grown, must live with the pain of a hostile or
discontinued relationship with his children. Thus, where
parents' impulses toward abusive conduct are destroying
their relationship with their children, the parents themselves
would benefit from intervention that can help them get on a
different track, a track that leads to a mutually rewarding
relationship with their offspring.
It is therefore a mistake, I think, to view state
intervention in abuse situations as always "for" the child and
"against" the parent. Parents share with children an interest
in receiving appropriate state intervention. Even where
termination is necessary to protect the child's interests, the
parent might also be better off on the whole, because that
outcome might create a possibility that would not otherwise
exist for a relationship after the child is grown. The child
might reinitiate contact with the parent later in life,
harboring less hostility to the parent than he or she would
have if the abuse had continued throughout childhood.
Believing this to be the case, when I represented parents
in child protective proceedings, I would sometimes talk to
them about what they wanted in the long-run in terms of a
relationship with their children, about how what they were
doing might prevent their achieving that objective, and about
what they might do, in cooperation with child protective
workers, to accomplish their aim. I would encourage them to
see that accepting some services might actually be the best
thing for them, in terms of their long-term goals for their
relationship with their children. Of course, accepting services
can also be a way to get the state to agree to suspend the
legal proceedings, so encouraging parents to accept services
was not inconsistent with helping them satisfy their desire
simply to avoid an adjudication of abuse or neglect or to avoid
termination proceedings. But it gives the attorney an
additional and entirely legitimate reason to recommend to the
client that he or she accept rehabilitative services, and
perhaps a way for the parent to actually approach counseling
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or parenting classes with a positive attitude, thereby
increasing the likelihood of success. Ultimately, of course, a
lawyer representing a competent adult must allow her client
to decide what he wants his lawyer to do for him, but I found
that many parents were capable of appreciating to some
degree that intervention was consistent with their self-
interests, not just in avoiding a finding or disposition, but
also in improving their relationship with their child.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judges who decide abuse and neglect cases should view
the child as a member of a family, not as an isolated member
of society. They should take into account that the child will
always have some interest in maintaining a relationship with
the abusive parent, and they should be aware that children's
interests, including interests other than interests in family
relationships, may vary depending on the unique
characteristics of their parents and their parents' community.
However, judges should be very self-conscious in thinking
about children as members of families. They should not allow
their attention to stray from the welfare of the children, and
should be made aware of the danger of slippage occasioned by
the parent-centered nature of family law jurisprudence. In
addition, judges should be more discriminating in thinking
about children's relationship interests; rather than assuming
that the relationship interest is of the same nature and
strength for every child, they should examine what kind of
relationship, if any, presently exists, and what the prospects
are for a relationship in the future. Sometimes the child's
interest in having a relationship will be quite strong, and
other times it may be barely significant. Lastly, while judges
should not make decisions in child-protective proceedings
based on sympathy for parents, judges who do sympathize
with the parents involved can receive comfort from knowing
that ordering parents to comply with a service plan, or even
ordering termination of the parent-child relationship, may
actually be the best thing for the parents, in terms of their
relationship interests, as well as for the child.
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